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1. Introduction
The empirical evidence on the impact of public subsidies on firms’ investment activities in Research
and Development (R&D hereafter) is mixed. Some studies show that public subsidies are
complementary to firms’ private investments, thereby boosting their innovation rate (e.g. Czarnitzki
and Hussinger, 2004; Bronzini and Piselli, 2016; Szücs, 2020); others document instead a crowdingout effect (e.g., Cerulli, 2010; Zúñiga-Vicente et al., 2014; Fölster, 1995; Griliches, 1998; Belderbos
et al., 2004; Colombo et al., 2006; Czarnitzki and Hottenrott, 2012; Crescenzi et al., 2018; Cantabene
and Grassi, 2018), or show that public subsidies do not affect firms’ private investments at all (e.g.,
Aristei et al., 2017).
The standard method to study the determinants of firms’ investment behaviour in R&D is based on
the econometric analysis of observational data. This approach, however, exhibits three main
problems. First, unobservable features of the market structure and firms’ organization make harder
the identification of the causal nexuses. Second, the use of different measurement techniques may
generate conflicting results. Third, econometric analyses can provide only ex-post evidence on the
effect of public intervention, without the possibility of building up a counterfactual where the policy
at issue is not implemented (Sørensen et al., 2010).
In this paper, we rely on experimental methods to investigate the impact of public subsidies on firms’

cooperation in R&D. We analyze contexts characterized by various degrees of product market
competition and levels of knowledge spillovers, for these are generally considered by both the
theoretical and empirical literature as the key conditions in influencing firms’ willingness to
cooperate. The effect of knowledge spillovers on cooperation is theoretically clear. As cooperating
firms internalize positive externalities and reduce fixed costs duplication, the higher is the level of
spillovers, the more firms are willing to cooperate in R&D (D’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988;
Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002; Suetens, 2005). On the contrary, the effect of product market
competition on R&D activities is far less clear. Indeed, several studies (e.g., Cassiman and Veugelers,
2002; Belderbos et al., 2004; Aghion et al., 2005; Wu, 2012, Ruble and Versaevel, 2014) have shown
that product market competition and firms’ willingness to cooperate in R&D are linked in a not
monotonic fashion.
The experimental method provides the working prototype of a small world where the effects of
interest are cleaned from confounding factors (Angrist and Pischke, 2010; Plott, 1996; Kagel 2009).
In cases like the one at hand, recourse to the Lab can be particularly fruitful, for the effect of policy
measures can be simulated under a great variety of circumstances and useful evidence can be collected
to improve the policy design. The experimental manipulation may provide the empirical ground for
an ex-ante evaluation of the efficacy of public policies in fostering firms’ cooperation in R&D.
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Specifically, by relying on the exogenous variation of the market setting, experimental investigations
can shed some light on the conditions that make public subsidies efficacious to boost cooperation in
R&D, as well as on the circumstances under which public subsidies are redundant or even
counterproductive.
So far, the experimental literature has mainly investigated the effect of market competition (e.g.,
Reynolds, 1988; Darai et al., 2010; Aghion et al., 2018; Silipo, 2005; Østbye and Roelofs, 2013),
and knowledge spillovers (e.g., Isaac and Reynolds, 1988; Suetens, 2005; Halbheer et al., 2009;
Roelofs et al.,, 2017) on subjects’ investments and cooperation in R&D. Moreover, some experiments
investigated the optimal allocation of public subsidies amongst innovating firms, to design incentivecompatible mechanisms that induce them to reveal truthfully their funding needs (e.g. Russo et al.,
2007; Giebe et al., 2006). To the best of our knowledge, no experimental investigation has assessed
the effect of public subsidies on firms’ cooperation rate and investment behaviour in market settings
with different levels of knowledge spillovers and product market competition.
Our experiment is based on a simplified version of the theoretical setting proposed by Capuano and
Grassi (2019). In line with a huge theoretical literature, they model a duopoly game where cooperation
in R&D may emerge as a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. In the first stage, firms declare their
potential interest in R&D cooperation; in the second, they decide whether to jointly invest in R&D

or not; in the third, they face Cournot competition in the product market. An important feature of the
model is that it considers a “breakthrough innovation, i.e. an innovation involving a significant
technological jump, creating a completely new market whose demand is independent of preexisting
goods” (Capuano and Grassi, 2019: 2). The main result is that the optimal scheme of subsidies should
be designed taking properly into account the intensity of the spillovers; the level of R&D costs; the
probability of successful innovation; the intensity of market competition.
The framework we present in Section 2 below takes all these elements into consideration, delivering
two clear predictions: i) given the level of market competition, higher spillovers favor cooperation
among firms (as in D’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988), but induce lower R&D investments if firms
decide not to cooperate; ii) given spillovers, cooperation reduces R&D investment levels when market
competition intensifies.
From these predictions, two consequences directly follow. First, in market characterized by relevant
spillovers, the provision of subsidies to foster cooperation might be useless, for cooperation would
emerge anyway. Second, in highly competitive markets, public subsidies, by encouraging
cooperation, may favour a reduction of the overall level of R&D investments which might be
inconsistent with the goals pursued by public authorities.
Experimentally, we extend Suetens (2005)’s design on duopolistic markets to make it cope with a
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setting in which the invention process is stochastic, different levels of market competition and
spillovers are possible, and subsidies to cooperating firms might be provided.
Subjects play a duopoly game for 25 rounds with random and anonymous matching to avoid
reputation effects and preserve the one-shot nature of the strategic interaction. As control groups, we
implement six markets that differ in both the level of spillovers and the degree of market competition.
Then, in the treatment groups, we replicate the six experimental markets incentivizing cooperation
by means of lump sum subsidies. Hence, for any combination of knowledge spillovers and
competition level, we can assess the impact of public subsidies on cooperation and investment rates
by comparing subjects’ behaviour in treatment (subsidies are provided) and control (no subsidies are
provided) markets.
In control markets, we find that the probability that a subject is willing to cooperate in R&D increases
on average by 10 percentage points in the level of knowledge spillovers; it instead decreases on
average by 20 percentage points as market competition increases. As far as investment rates are
concerned, we find that these decrease by 24 percentage points, on average, in the level of knowledge
spillovers, and by 11 percentage points in the level of market competition.
In focus markets – i.e., in markets in which the provision of incentives is expected to induce a shift
in the equilibrium strategies, from non-cooperation to cooperation – the probability that a subject is

willing to cooperate in R&D increases on average by 36 percentage points compared to the control:
hence, subsidies prove effective in boosting R&D cooperation. However, there is evidence that when
subjects cooperate because of the provision of subsidies, the average investment rate declines (up to
16 percentage points in focus markets). This supports the strand of literature (e.g., Fölster, 1995;
Griliches, 1998; Belderbos et al., 2004; Colombo et al., 2006; Czarnitzki and Hottenrott, 2012;
Crescenzi et al., 2018; Cantabene and Grassi, 2018), according to which public intervention to boost
cooperation in R&D might be counterproductive if the goal is to promote a higher level of investment
in R&D.
As a policy implication, these results suggest that the use of public subsidies is not to be
indiscriminate. Contingent on market conditions, subsidies can be redundant - for firms would
cooperate anyway - or even counterproductive, for, by inducing a higher rate of cooperation, they can
indirectly stimulate lower R&D investments. All of this might translate into a waste of public funds.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sketches the theoretical setting. Section
3 illustrates the experimental design in detail, while Section 4 investigates the effects on cooperation
and investments deriving by changes in the structural parameters. Section 5 examines the effect of
public subsidies on both subjects’ cooperation rate and investment behaviour. Section 6 concludes.
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2. Theoretical setting
Our experiment is based on the theoretical framework proposed by Capuano and Grassi (2019). This
setting has the following basic characteristics. Two firms (i, j) have the chance to rely on binding
contracts to share the cost of R&D activities aimed at developing a new product. Coordination allows
firms to fully internalize knowledge spillovers and partially reduce fixed costs duplication.
There are two phases in the model: an investment and a production phase. The R&D phase
contemplates two mutually exclusive scenarios, depending on whether firms decide to coordinate
their R&D activities (cooperative scenario) or not (non-cooperative scenario). In the first scenario,
firms jointly decide the investment level, sharing the associated cost; if the investment is successful,
both firms will be able to produce and sell the innovative good. When firms agree to coordinate their
R&D investments, they receive a lump sum subsidy S ≥ 0 from the government.
In the second scenario, each firm acts independently, bearing the whole cost of the investment and
being aware that the rival may be able to imitate due to the presence of knowledge spillovers. When
firms decide not to cooperate, they may realize either duopolistic profits (D) - i.e., the profits that the
two firms in the duopoly realize when they both manage to innovate - or monopolistic (M) profits i.e., the profits that only one firm realizes as it is the only one that innovates. The production phase
is characterized by Cournot competition in any scenario. The strength of competition is measured by

an index of product differentiation, α ∈ [0,1], computed as the ratio between the non-cooperative
duopolistic (D) and monopolistic (M) profits, i.e. α = D / M. Hence, the larger is α the lower the
difference between monopolistic and duopolistic profit: i.e., the lower are the competitive pressures
in the product market.
As shown in Figure 1, the interaction between firms is modelled as a non-repeated game with
complete information.
Figure 1. Timing of the game

t = 0

𝑡=1

𝑡=2

𝑡=3

Public subsidies

Firms agree to

Firms set R&D

Competition in the

announced

cooperate or not

investments

product market

At time t = 0, the government announces the level of the lump sum public subsidy ሺ𝑆 ≥ 0ሻ that firms
get if they cooperate in R&D; at time t = 1, firms simultaneously decide whether to create a Research
Joint Venture (RJV) or not; at time t = 2, any firm chooses the investment level, jointly (if both opt
for an RJV) or independently (otherwise); finally, at t = 3, once R&D outcomes and spillovers are
observed, each firm independently decides its Cournot production level.
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The innovation process is stochastic. The probability of innovation, 𝜌ሺ. ሻ ∈ ሾ0.1ሿ, is assumed to be
increasing in the investment level, with investments being characterized by diminishing marginal
returns: 𝜌′ > 0, 𝜌′′ < 0.
If at time 𝑡 = 1 an agreement is not reached (non-cooperative scenario), each firm independently
decides the level of its R&D activities. In this case, firm k = (i, j)’s probability of innovating, 𝜌ሺ𝑘ሻ ∈
ሾ0,1ሿ, is assumed to be independent of: i) the R&D activities brought about by its rival, i.e. 𝑥−𝑘 ; ii)

the probability 𝜌ሺ𝑥−𝑘 ሻ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ that the rival is successful at innovating given its investment decisions
(non-tournament approach).
Each firm is aware that in case no agreement is reached, its competitor might - with probability 𝛽 ∈
ሾ0,1ሿ - imitate its innovation (presence of spillovers effects)4. In this case, given the probability of

successful innovation, ρ, spillover effects, β, and the differentiation index, 𝛼 = 𝐷/𝑀, firm 𝑘’s
expected profits can be written as follows:

𝐸𝛱𝑘𝑁𝐶 = 𝑟𝑘𝑑 ∙ 𝐷 + 𝑟𝑘𝑚 ∙ 𝑀 − 𝑥𝑘𝑁𝐶

(1)

where:

− 𝑟𝑘𝑑 = 𝜌𝑘 𝜌−𝑘 + 𝜌𝑘 ሺ1 − 𝜌−𝑘 ሻ𝛽 + ሺ1 − 𝜌𝑘 ሻሺ𝜌−𝑘 ሻ𝛽 is the probability that the relevant firm k =
(i, j) is engaged in duopolistic competition in the production phase: this occurs when both
firms innovate or one innovates and the other is successful at imitating;
− 𝑟𝑘𝑚 = 𝜌𝑘 ሺ1 − 𝜌−𝑘 ሻሺ1 − 𝛽ሻ, is the probability that firm k = (i, j) enjoys monopoly profits in the
production phase: this occurs when the relevant firm innovates and the rival neither innovates
nor is successful at imitating.
If at time t = 1 an agreement is reached (cooperative scenario), firms jointly invest in R&D and
equally share the whole cost of the investment. The expected profit of firm k = (i, j) will be:
𝐸𝛱𝑘𝐶 = 𝑟𝑘𝑐 ∙ 𝐷 − 𝑥𝑘𝐶 + 𝑆

(2)

where 𝑆 is the level of public subsidy and 𝑟𝑘𝑐 = 𝜌ሺ2𝑥𝑘 ሻ is the probability of innovating induced by
𝐶
the overall R&D expenditure, given that 𝑥𝑘𝐶 = 𝑥−𝑘
.

4 As in Capuano and Grassi (2019), knowledge spillovers are ex-post, measured as the probability to be imitated.
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The market for a new product is created when at least one competitor innovates. If none innovates,
no revenues are obtained by firms (profits are instead negative, because of R&D expenditures). If one
firm innovates and the other does not, the innovator gains the monopolistic profit, M > 0, while the
rival obtains zero, unless it imitates the firm obtaining the innovation. If either both firms innovate or
one firm innovates and the other imitates each firm obtains duopoly profits D, where D = M with
α ∈ [0,1].
In any sub-game, firms – independently or jointly – set a level of R&D expenditure such that expected
profits are maximized. Hence, cooperation in R&D emerges as a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium
(SPNE) of the game if and only if the difference between 𝐸𝛱𝑘𝐶 and 𝐸𝛱𝑘𝑁𝐶 is non-negative for any firm
k = (i, j) whose investment decisions are optimal in any sub-game. By construction, the difference
𝐸𝛱𝑘𝐶 − 𝐸𝛱𝑘𝑁𝐶 is increasing in both the level of the public subsidy and the probability of knowledge
spillovers, while it decreases with market differentiation. Some further considerations are due in order
to understand how the possibility of cooperation affects investment decisions.
2.1 Theoretical predictions
The model stresses the trade-off between two distinct effects that affect incentives to cooperate in
presence of knowledge spillovers. On the one hand, cooperation, by fully internalizing spillovers,

increases the probability that firms successfully innovate for any given pair of balanced investment
levels: this stimulates cooperation. On the other hand, due to the assumption of joint patenting, the
probability of becoming a monopolist in the production phase is zero. Thus, the tougher the
duopolistic competition, the lower the per-firm expected profit in a duopoly, the lower hence is the
incentive to cooperate. For the same reasons, aggregate investment levels can decrease with
cooperation.
Moreover, when competition in the product market is tough (i.e., differentiation between final goods
is low), expected returns for additional R&D investment decrease, and this has a negative impact on
the overall investment level. Therefore, even if public subsidies mechanically encourage cooperation,
they cannot, in general, be advocated on the grounds that they increase the overall investment level
in R&D.
In equilibrium (SPNE) the private incentive to cooperate in R&D is positively affected by the level
of spillovers and negatively affected by the intensity of market competition.
It is then possible to state the following theoretical predictions:
•

Given the level of market competition, higher spillovers favor cooperation among firms but
induce lower R&D investments if firms do not cooperate;

•

Given spillovers, cooperation reduces R&D investment levels in presence of strong market
7
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competition.
The theoretical model sketched above makes clear that when the policymaker is not exclusively
concerned with implementing cooperation per se, but rather, for example, with increasing the overall
investment level to favor the emergence of innovations, providing subsidies without considering
market conditions does not qualify as an efficient use of public resources. This may for example
occur whenever firms have sufficiently high private incentives to spontaneously cooperate and
jointly invest in R&D (as it is in presence of high spillovers and high product differentiation).

3. Materials and Methods
In this section, we illustrate our experimental design. It extends Suetens (2005)’s experimental setting
along two key dimensions. First, it introduces the level of product differentiation as a structural
parameter affecting subjects’ R&D investments. Second, it introduces uncertainty in the innovation
process, in the spirit of the stochastic invention model that Isaac and Reynolds (1988) first tested in
the lab.
3.1 The setting
A gender-balanced sample of 120 undergraduate and master students in economics from the
University of Economics (VSE) and Charles University of Prague, took part in a trial run at the
Laboratory of Experimental Economics (LEE, VSE) in March 2016. Participation granted a show-up
fee of 100 CZK (3.7 euros). Potential subjects were randomly selected from the database of the
Laboratory of Experimental Economics (LEE) and formally invited by e-mail to sign-up to ORSEE
(On-line Recruitment System for Economic Experiments).
Once recruited, subjects were randomly assigned to one of 12 experimental sessions, 6 for the control
and 6 for the treatment. Each session comprised a group of 10 subjects. The trial was designed as a
computer-based experiment managed by a z-tree script (Fischbacher 2007). Subjects were randomly
assigned to computer slots that were completely isolated to guarantee full anonymity. They were not
allowed to talk during the session and lab assistants checked for compliance (Instructions are reported
in the Supplementary material).
The experimental design was based on the duopoly game described in Section 2 above. Each subject
knew that (s)he would have played the game for 25 rounds, with random and anonymous matching
in any round. These features of the matching process preserve the one-shot nature of the strategic
interaction.
Participants were informed at the beginning of the experiment about the circumstances characterizing
8
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the interaction between subjects: the level of knowledge spillovers (β) and the degree of product
differentiation (α ).
Experimentally, we consider three possible levels of product differentiation, α ∈{0.10, 0.45, 0.70}.
The higher is the level of differentiation, the lower is the competitive constraint in a duopoly (in our
theoretical setting, the parameter α plays the role of an inverse index of market competition). By
differentiating their products from competitors, firms can create a monopolistic market, where they
enjoy a price-making power.
We consider only two possible levels of knowledge spillovers, β ∈{0.20, 0.80}.

By combining the possible values taken up by parameters α and β, six experimental markets can be
conceived, each of whom characterizes one of the six control sessions and one of the six treatment
sessions. In some of these markets, public subsidies are necessary for cooperation to occur, i.e.
without subsidies, cooperation does not emerge as a SPNE of the game.
3.2 Interaction
Each session in the control was characterized by a specific (α, β)-pair and involved a group of 10
subjects. The game was repeated for 25 rounds (plus two rounds at the beginning, just for practicing)
to ensure that subjects became familiar with its rules. Subjects were aware of the random and
anonymous matching process.
In every round, each participant was endowed with 200 monetary units (MU) and could invest in
R&D any amount of this endowment. Monetary units not invested in a given round could be converted
in CZK crown at the end of the experiment5.
At the end of each round, any subject was informed about his own round-specific profit; he was aware
of the choices of his opponent only in the case of cooperation.
The game was implemented in the lab through three phases: information phase, investment phase,
production phase.
Information Phase. At the beginning of each session subjects observed a printed graphic with the
probability of innovation, ρ ∈ (0, 0.45), depicted as an increasing concave function of the investment
level (see Figure 1).

5

Given the exchange rate, the gain for a subject who abstained from investing throughout the experiment was about 12 euro: 200MU

×25 = 5000 MU = 300 CZK ~ 12 EUR. The exchange rate was set at 0.06 CZK for any MU.
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[Figure 1, near here]
They could thus recognize the intrinsic uncertainty of the innovation process. Subjects could also
observe two matrices displaying the expected payoffs associated with specific investment levels (see
the Supplementary material). These matrices conveyed information both for the non-cooperative
scenario - where participants invest autonomously in R&D - and for the cooperative one, where
agreements upon a joint investment level in R&D is allowed (see Tables A1NC/A1C- A6NC/A6C in
the Supplementary material). These matrices were printed in two separate sheets of paper and were
built by computing expected profits for various (α, β)-pair and different combinations of investment
levels.
We assumed throughout that monopoly profits M equal 1000 MU.
Investment Phase. Given the information set, subjects had to decide in any round whether to
coordinate their R&D decisions or not. As specified above, two different scenarios could arise.
A Cooperative scenario comes about whenever both subjects in the duopoly are willing to coordinate
their R&D investments, in which case they are given the chance to bargain on the joint investment
level.
The use of a profit calculator - to simulate the expected payoffs for any possible joint level of

investment so as to formulate a proposal to the counterpart - was allowed during the experiment. No
restrictions were imposed on the number of proposals. As soon as subjects agreed on a joint
investment level, then a symmetric binding contract entailing each subject to bear half of the cost of
the investment was automatically made.
A Non-cooperative scenario comes about whenever either one of the two subjects randomly paired is
not willing to coordinate R&D investments or subjects fail to reach an agreement in the contracting
phase. In this scenario subjects were free to decide their investment level autonomously, being aware
of the possibility of being copied by the competitor.
Production Phase. According to the experimental rules, monopoly profits (equal 1000 MU) can be
obtained only in the non-cooperative scenario, in the event that only one subject is able to produce
and sell the innovative good. Otherwise, subjects get duopoly profits, with production fixed at the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Collusion in the product market is not allowed.
3.3 Treatment
Each session in the treatment was characterized by a triplet (α, β, S). The six control markets were
replicated by providing S = 30 monetary units (the lump sum public subsidy) to those who managed
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to sign a symmetric binding agreement on a joint R&D investment. Subsidies were announced at the
beginning of the Session. They were only provided from round 7 to 21, and this was publicly known.
This latter design feature allows measuring subjects’ reaction to changes in the incentive structure
also within the treatment.
Notice that, due to the random and anonymous matching, the finitely repeated duopoly game
implemented in the lab has a unique SPNE outcome that corresponds to the equilibrium outcome of
the one-shot game. On these grounds, in Table 1, for each triplet (α, β, S) we summarize the
theoretically predicted outcomes in terms of cooperative (C) and non-cooperative (NC) investment
behaviour, both in the control (S=0 MU) and in the treatment groups (S=30 MU), given the shape of
the innovation function and the other parameter values.
Table 1 illustrates the choices - i.e. whether cooperate (C) or not (NC) in R&D activities – that
subjects are expected to make for each combination of the parameters α and β. The Table considers
both the control (left panel) and the treatment groups (right panel).
[Table 1, near here]
In the control groups, subjects are expected to cooperate, in equilibrium, in cases IV to VI. The

provision of 30 MUs is clearly not expected to alter, in these cases, the incentives subjects have,
hence their equilibrium strategies. For case I, instead, providing subjects with 30 MUs is not enough
to incentivize cooperation. Table 1 also clarifies that in cases II (α=0.10, β=0.80) and III (α=0.45,
β=0.80) the provision of subsidies is able to change the incentives of the game compared to the control
group, thereby supporting cooperation in R&D as a SPNE.
3.4 Testable Hypotheses
Grounding on the theoretical model sketched in Section 3 above, we make the following experimental
hypotheses:
HP1. In the control, the willingness to coordinate R&D investments is increasing in α and β.
The rationale behind HP1 goes as follows: for given levels of product differentiation (𝛼), the higher
is the level of knowledge spillovers (𝛽ሻ, the lower is the appropriability of returns deriving from noncooperative investments. Hence, subjects in a duopoly market with higher 𝛽 have a stronger incentive
to coordinate R&D investments to internalize spillovers, increase the probability of innovating for
any balanced investment levels, and getting duopoly profits.
As for market competition, remember that when subjects sign a symmetric binding agreement, the
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probability of getting monopoly profits is zero. Thus, for given levels of spillovers, the lower is the
level of product differentiation (i.e. the lower is 𝛼), the lower are the expected profits of cooperative
investments compared to the non-cooperative ones. Conversely, when final products are strongly
differentiated, firms’ profits are weakly affected by the presence of a competitor: i.e., duopolistic
profits tend to monopolistic ones as 𝛼 increases. At the same time, cooperation reduces fixed costs
duplication. Hence, when products are strongly differentiated (i.e., the level of market competition is
low) subjects’ expected profits of cooperation are higher.
HP2. In the control, the investment levels in the non-cooperative scenario are decreasing in 𝛽.
The rationale behind this hypothesis follows from the previous argument. For a given level of market
differentiation, if subjects do not cooperate, the higher the probability of being imitated, the lower is
the incentive to invest in R&D.
HP3. In the control, the average investment level is increasing in α.
For a given level of knowledge spillovers, the duopolistic profits approximate the monopolistic ones
as the level of market differentiation increases. Hence, subjects have a stronger incentive to invest in
R&D, both in the cooperative and in the non-cooperative scenario.
We now turn to the effect of public subsidies. Therefore, we focus on cases II (α=0.10, β=0.80) and
III (α=0.45, β=0.20), where the provision of additional monetary units is expected to induce a change
in subjects’ investment behaviour.
HP4. In cases II (α=0.10, β=0.80) and III (α=0.45, β=0.20), the provision of additional 30 monetary
units increases the average willingness to cooperate in R&D investments compared to the control.
This hypothesis directly follows from the assumption that subjects rationally react to the change in
the incentive structure of the game converging to the SPNE outcome. Indeed, the provision of public
subsidies increases the expected profits of cooperation, inducing subjects to coordinate their R&D
investments.
HP5. In cases II (α=0.10, β=0.80) and III (α=0.45, β=0.20), cooperation induced by public subsidies
is associated with lower investments in R&D .
The rationale behind HP5 is the following. In these market settings, the relatively high level of
competition makes subjects’ expected profits from cooperation lower, compared to the expected
profits of non-cooperative investments. Whenever subjects choose to cooperate, theinvest less
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compared to the non-cooperative scenario. Hence, if public subsidies encourage cooperation, then
they indirectly induce a lower level of investments in R&D.
4. Results: Effects of spillovers and competition on cooperation and investments in R&D
In this section, we test hypotheses HP1-HP3, providing evidence on how subjects react, in the
baseline, to changes in incentives due to the exogenous variation in the level of both knowledge
spillovers ሺ𝛽ሻ and product differentiation ሺ𝛼ሻ. To this end, we estimate the following behavioural
equations:

𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1 𝑆𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ + 𝛾2 𝑃𝐷𝑚𝑒𝑑 + 𝛾3 𝑃𝐷ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ + 𝜂𝑖𝑡

(3)

𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1 𝑆𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ + 𝛿2 𝑃𝐷𝑚𝑒𝑑 + 𝛿3 𝑃𝐷ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(4)

In equation 3, 𝐶𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable taking value 1 when the individual is willing to cooperate in
R&D at time t, and 0 otherwise; 𝑆𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ is a dummy variable taking value 1 for the highest level of
spillovers and 0 otherwise; 𝑃𝐷𝑚𝑒𝑑 and 𝑃𝐷ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ

are dummy variables taking value 1 for an

intermediate to a high level of product differentiation ; 𝜂𝑖𝑡 is an error term. In equation 4, the

dependent variable 𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 stands for the individual investment rate (i.e. the ratio between the investment
level and the endowment) at t. The standard errors were bootstrapped for 10000 replications to take
into account the correlation among observations across rounds (MacKinnon 2006, Horowitz 2019).
Results are in Table 2.
As for the effect of exogenous changes in 𝛼 and 𝛽 on subjects’ average willingness to cooperate,
results (first column) are consistent with our theoretical expectations. Indeed, the probability that
subjects are willing to cooperate in R&D significantly increases by 10 percentage points moving from
a low to a high level of knowledge spillovers. Moreover, an increase of 35 percentage points in the
level of product differentiation induces an increase in the individual willingness to cooperate of 16
percentage points; while an increase of 60 percentage points in the degree of product differentiation
induces an increase of 40 percentage points in the individual willingness to cooperate in R&D. This
entails that a change from a low to a medium level of product differentiation - as well as a change
from a medium to a high level of product differentiation - induces an average increase in the
individual willingness to cooperate in R&D of about 20 percentage points. The experimental
investigation, therefore, confirms that the probability of cooperation tends to increase with both
knowledge spillovers and product differentiation.

13
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2022

15

Submission to Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers

[Table 2, near here]
We now turn to the effect of a change in the value of the structural parameters on investment
behaviour (HP2 – HP3) by estimating equation 4. Table 2 (second column) shows that an increase in
the level of knowledge spillovers significantly reduces the average investment rate by 24 percentage
points. This supports HP2. Moreover, in line with HP3, an increase in product differentiation induces
an average increase in the individual investment rate of approximately 11 percentage points.
5. Results: Effect of subsidies on cooperation and investment rate
In this section, we analyse the effect of subsidizing cooperation in R&D. We also examine the
difference in investment behaviour between cooperating and non-cooperating subjects. For our
purposes, we first restrict our analysis to cases II (α=0.10, β=0.80) and III (α=0.20, β=0.45). Indeed,
these are the only cases in which the provision of public subsidies is expected to induce a shift from
non-cooperation to cooperation: in all the other cases, equilibrium strategies dictate either «never
cooperate» or «always cooperate», independently from the provision of subsidies. Finally we examine
cases I and IV-VI too.

5.1 Effect of subsidies on cooperation: cases II and III
Here we test whether the provision of additional monetary units increases the average willingness to
cooperate in R&D investments (HP4). As detailed in Section 3, we partitioned the 25 rounds played
by treated subjects into three time periods, depending on whether subsidies are only announced
(rounds 1-6), provided (rounds 7-21) or removed (rounds 22-25). This design feature allows us to
exploit both within and between-subject behavioural variations, and implementing a difference-indifferences analysis.
As a preliminary step, in Figure 2 we plot the dynamics of subjects’ average willingness to coordinate
R&D investments both in the treatment and control, by jointly considering Cases II and III.
[Figure 2, near here]
We observe that, in control groups, individuals’ willingness to cooperate is approximately stable
through rounds. Conversely, in treatment groups, it significantly increases when additional monetary
units are provided (rounds 7-21) and then falls when subsidies are removed. Thus, the provision of
public subsidies does not induce any announcement or persistence effect influencing the average
willingness to cooperate in R&D, as subjects simply respond to changes in the material incentives of
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the game.
To provide support to this evidence, we implement a difference-in-differences analysis between
treatment and control group by estimating the following behavioural equation:
𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝜋0 + 𝜋1 𝑆 + 𝜋2 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝜋3 𝐷𝐼𝐷 + 𝜐𝑖𝑡

(5)

where Cit is a dummy capturing the individual willingness to cooperate in R&D. As 𝑆 is the dummy
denoting the treatment group, 𝜋1 measures the average difference in the individual willingness to
cooperate in R&D between treatment and control groups when subsidies are not provided (i.e., in
rounds 1-6 and 22-25). The dummy variable time takes value 1 in those rounds where public subsidies
are provided to cooperating subjects, and 0 otherwise; therefore, 𝜋2 measures the difference in the
individual willingness to cooperate in R&D investments between rounds 7-21 and the other rounds.
𝐷𝐼𝐷 stands for the usual difference-in-differences interaction term between S and time.
We estimate equation (5) for cases II and III, where the provision of public subsidies is expected to
boost subjects’ cooperation. Results are in Table 3. Estimations support HP 4, as the provision of
subsidies significantly increases the probability of cooperation in R&D.
[Table 3, near here]
Specifically, looking at the coefficient associated to S, no difference between treatment and control
group is recorded when public subsidies are not provided. Moreover, the coefficient associated with
the dummy time, documents that subjects in the control group do not exhibit a significant difference
in their willingness to cooperate between rounds 7-21 and the other rounds. Hence, the significant
increase in the willingness to cooperate measured by the positive coefficient associated with the
difference-in-differences interaction term (Time*S) can be attributed to the actual provision of
subsidies. More specifically, in Cases II and III, when public subsidies are provided (rounds 7-21),
the probability that a subject is willing to cooperate in R&D increases, on average, by 36 percentage
points compared to the control. In other words, public subsidies increase individuals’ average
willingness to cooperate in R&D by 80% of its actual mean (i.e., 0.45).
5.2 Effect of subsidies on cooperation: cases I and IV-VI
In this Section we consider all the market settings in which subsidies do not change the incentive
structure of the duopoly game. Thus, in Figure 3 we plot the average willingness to cooperate in R&D
over rounds. We separately consider Cases IV to VI (panel a), where subjects are expected to
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cooperate in both treatment and control6 and Case I (panel b), where subjects should never cooperate.
In panel a, we observe that willingness to cooperate tends to overlap between treatment and control,
suggesting that the provision of public subsidies does not impact on subjects’ behavior.
In Case I (Fig 3, panel b), the pattern is less clear. During the pre-treatment period (i.e., round 1-6),
the average willingness to cooperate in R&D is lower in the treatment group. However, in rounds 721 it increases, remaining stably higher than in the control group up to the end of the treatment period
(round 21). This seems to suggest that the provision of public subsidies, though not affecting the
incentive structure of the game, may induce subjects, in this case, to display a higher willingness to
cooperate.
[Figure 3, near here]
Estimating equation (5) for cases I and IV-VI delivers results coherent with the graphical analysis. In
Cases IV to VI the coefficient associated to the interaction term (Time*S) is not significantly different
from zero: i.e., since the provision of public subsidies in these market settings does not affect the
incentives of the game, no difference is recorded in subjects’ willingness to cooperate in R&D.
However, results are at odds with our expectations in Case I (Column 1), where subjects should not

be conditioned by the provision of subsidies. Indeed, the coefficient associated to the difference-indifferences interaction term (Time*S) is significantly positive, documenting that subjects in the
treatment group tend to increase their willingness to cooperate in rounds 7-21 compared to the control.
[Table 4, near here]
A plausible explanation of this result is related with the well-known framing effect (Kahnemann and
Tversky, 2013). In an environment in which the incentive structure obviously dictates noncooperation, the provision of subsidies might change the way the game is perceived. Taking into
account the computational difficulties subjects face in comparing the two different scenarios to
determine the profit-maximizing choice, the provision of subsidies might be meant by subjects as a
cue that the right scenario – the one whose selection gives rise to a right to be rewarded – is the
cooperative one. Indeed, this kind of effect is not observed in cases IV to VI, where public subsidies

6 The pattern of the average willingness to cooperate in each case singularly taken from 4 to 6 is analogous to the aggregated one

presented in panel a of Figure 1. Graphics are available upon request.
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do not change the perception of the game: it was, and still is, after the provision of subsidies, a game
which must be played cooperatively.
5.3 Investment behavior
In this section, we perform a within-control and a within-treatment analysis to get more details on
subjects’ investment behaviour.
Preliminarily, in Figure 4 we plot the dynamics of cooperative and non-cooperative investment rates
- control and treatment groups, cases II and III - together with the theoretically predicted rates of noncooperative (i.e., the horizontal grey line) and cooperative (i.e., the horizontal dashed black line)
investments.
[Figure 4, near here]
In the control, we observe that in both cases the dynamics of the average rate of cooperative and noncooperative investments do not follow a clear pattern and tend to overlap, providing graphical
evidence of no significant differences between them.7
As for the treatment groups, in both cases the average of cooperative investment rates exhibit a clearer

pattern. In case II, when subsidies are provided, cooperating subjects invest on average 10% of their
endowment, a significantly larger share than the theoretically predicted rate of 4%. In case II, instead,
cooperating subjects invest on average 43% of their endowment when subsidies are provided, slightly
lower than the theoretically predicted rate of 48%.
In Case II, the dynamics of cooperative and non-cooperative investment rates tend to overlap, due to
the small difference between the respective theoretically predicted rates. Nonetheless, in line with our
theoretical predictions, non-cooperative investment rates are on average higher than cooperative ones
when public subsidies are provided, with a small positive difference of 0.031 that is statistically
significant only if we consider the one-tailed p-value of 0.074 (Wilcoxon signed-rank test).
In Case III, we observe that in the first 6 rounds – when subsidies are only announced – the dynamics
of the average cooperative investment rate is highly variable, while it is more stable across rounds
when subsidies are provided. Overall, the average non-cooperative investment rate exhibits an
increasing trend in rounds 7-21. Hence, when subsidies are provided, non-cooperative investment
rates are on average higher than the cooperative ones, with a statistically significant positive

7 In both cases, the average difference between cooperative and non-cooperative investment rates are never statistically significant.
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differences of 0.266 (two-tailed p-value = 0.000, Wilcoxon signed-rank test).
In Figure 5, we plot the dynamics of the average cooperative and non-cooperative investment rates
in the remaining cases both for the control (left panel) and treatment groups (right panel).

[Figure 5, near here]

In cases IV to VI we do not observe substantial differences between control and treatment groups,

with the exception of case VI, where the dynamics of the average cooperative and non-cooperative
investment rates in the treatment are more clearly separated than in the control.
For case I, instead, we observe some differences. In the control group, the dynamics of cooperative
and non-cooperative investment rates tend to overlap. In the treatment, the average cooperative
investment rate exhibits a declining trend from round 11 onward. As a consequence, cooperative
investment rates are on average lower than non-cooperative ones, especially when subsidies are
provided (diff = 0.403 p-value = 0.000).
We deepen the graphical analysis by performing a Difference-in-differences estimation within the

control and within the treatment groups, focusing on cases II and III only. We estimate the following
model:
𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1 𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃2 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝜃3 𝐷𝐼𝐷1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(6)

where 𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable taking value 1 if subjects invest cooperatively in R&D at time t;
hence, 𝜃1 measures the average difference between cooperative and non-cooperative investment rates
when the dummy variable time equals zero (i.e., in rounds 1-6 and 22-25). Parameter 𝜃2 (associated
with the dummy time for the rounds 7-21 when subsidies are provided) measures the difference in
average non-cooperative investment rate between rounds 7-21 and the other rounds. Finally, DID1 is
the difference-in-differences interaction term between cooperative investments (𝐶𝐼) and 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒; 𝜃3 ,
therefore, compares cooperative and non-cooperative investment rates before and after the provision
of public subsidies in rounds 7-21. Results are reported in Table 5.
[Table 5, near here]
Considering within control estimates (first two columns), regressions results record no significant
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differences between cooperative and non-cooperative investment rates. The picture changes if one
considers within treatment estimates (last two columns). Table 5 documents that, in line with our
theoretical expectations, cooperative investment rates are systematically lower than non-cooperative
ones. Specifically, in both cases the negative coefficient associated to the dummy variable 𝐶𝐼𝑖
documents that cooperative investment rates are significantly lower than the non-cooperative ones in
rounds where subsidies are not provided (i.e., rounds 1-6 and 22-25).
In Case II, the insignificant (and close to 0) coefficient associated to the dummy time shows that noncooperative investment rates do not significantly change in rounds 7-21. Moreover, the insignificant
coefficient associated to the difference-in-difference interaction term documents that, on average,
cooperative investment rates do not significantly vary when public subsidies are provided compared
to non-cooperative investment rates.
In Case III the significant positive coefficient associated to the dummy time, documents that noncooperative investment rates significantly increase when public subsidies are provided. Due to that,
the coefficient associated with the differences-in-differences interaction term (CI*time) measures a
negative and statistically significant difference of 16 percentage points between cooperative and noncooperative investment rates when subsidies are provided.
Overall, regression analysis shows that, in competitive markets, cooperation induced by public

subsidies entails a lower than average investment rate compared to the non-cooperative scenario. This
is consistent with the strand of literature pointing to a crowding out effect of public subsidies on R&D
investments.
6. Discussion and concluding remarks
In this paper, we have analyzed the impact of public subsidies on firms' R&D activities in markets
characterized by varying degrees of competition and spillovers. We have found that the probability
of cooperation increases with the level of knowledge spillovers and decreases with level of product
differentiation (the opposite is true as far investment rates are concerned).
To assess the impact of public subsidies on cooperation rates, we first focused on cases in which the
provision of additional monetary units is expected to induce a shift from a non-cooperative to a
cooperative strategy. Our Difference-in-Differences analysis has documented a significant and
substantial positive effect of public subsidies on cooperation. We have also analyzed cases in which
the provision of additional monetary units is not expected to have an impact, for subjects would have
incentives to cooperate anyway.
The relevant policy implication is that targeting public subsidies on a careful diagnosis of the
structural parameters of the market would avoid a waste of resources whenever public funds are

19
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2022

21

Submission to Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers

delivered to firms that would have cooperated anyway: i.e. either when competition in the product
market is low or when the level of knowledge spillovers is high.
We have also analyzed the impact of public subsidies on investment rates. What we have found is
that in competitive markets the provision of additional monetary units encourages cooperation but
may reduce the average investment rate. Hence, consistently with the relevant literature on the subject
(e.g. Cerulli 2010; Zúñiga-Vicente et al. 2014; Fölster, 1995; Griliches 1998; Belderbos et al. 2004;
Colombo et al. 2006; Czarnitzki and Hottenrott 2012; Crescenzi et al. 2018; Cantabene and Grassi
201), we showed that, even if public subsidies mechanically encourage cooperation, they cannot, in
general, be advocated on the grounds that they increase the overall investment level in R&D.
On the whole, the message is that the use of public subsidies is not to be indiscriminate. Contingent
on market conditions, subsidies can indeed be redundant, for firms would have cooperated anyway,
or inefficacious, for they are not capable to foster cooperation appreciably. All of this might translate
into an inefficient use of public funds.
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Appendix

Figure 1. Probability of successful innovation as a function of investment.
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Figure 2. Dynamics of the average willingness to cooperate (cases II and III).
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Figure 3. Dynamics of the average willingness to cooperate
(Cases IV-VI and Case I).
a) Cases IV-VI

b) Case I
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Figure 4.
Dynamics of average investment rate Cases II and III
(Control and Treatment).
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Figure 5. Dynamics of average investment rate Cases I, IV, V, VI
(Control & Treatment).
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Table 1. Predicted outcomes in Control and Treatment groups.

Control Groups
S=0 MUs

Treatment Groups
S=30 MUs

β=0.20

β=0.80

β=0.20

β=0.80

α=0.10

NC (I)

NC (II)

NC (I)

C (II)

α=0.45

NC (III)

C (IV)

C (III)

C (IV)

α=0.70

C (V)

C (VI)

C (V)

C (VI)

Note. The parameter 𝛼 is a measure of product differentiation. The parameter 𝛽 is a measure of
knowledge spillovers. Subsidies are 30 monetary units provided to cooperating subjects in the
treatment groups during rounds 7-21.
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Table 2. Effect of knowledge spillovers and competition on cooperation and
investments in R&D.
Willingness to Cooperate in R&D

Investment Rate in R&D

0.100***
(0.024)

–0.247***
(0.014)

0.400***
(0.029)

0.236***
(0.017)

𝑷𝑫𝒎𝒆𝒅

0.164***
(0.029)

0.083***
(0.018)

Constant

0.268***
(0.024)

0.502***
(0.016)

R-squared

0.116

0.257

N

1500

1500

𝑺𝑷𝒉𝒊𝒈𝒉
(High level of knowledge spillovers)

𝑷𝑫𝒉𝒊𝒈𝒉
(High level of product differentiation)

(Intermediate level of product differentiation)

Note. In the first column, the dependent variable is a dummy taking the value of one if subjects are willing to cooperate
and zero otherwise. In the second column, the dependent variable is the subjects’ investment rate: i.e., the ratio between
the per-round individual investment level and the endowment of 200 MUs. The variable SPhigh is a dummy taking value
one for high levels of spillovers. The variables PDhigh and PDmed are dummies taking value one for high and intermediate
levels of product differentiation respectively. The variable Agreement is a dummy taking value one when subjects manage
to sign a binding agreement, and zero otherwise. Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 3. Treatment effect of subsidies (Cases II and III).
Case II

Case III

Subsidies

–0.060
(0.066)

–0.030
(0.069)

time
(Rounds 7-21)

–0.006
(0.061)

–0.053
(0.062)

time*S

0.326***
(0.086)

0.410***
(0.087)

Constant

0.360***
(0.048)

0.400***
(0.049)

R-squared

0.069

0.109

n

500

Note. The dependent variable is a dummy taking value one if subjects are willing to cooperate in R&D.
The variable Subsidies is a dummy equal to one for the treatment groups. time is a dummy taking value
one for those rounds (7-21) in the treatment groups where 30 MUs are provided to cooperating subjects.
time*S is the differences-in-differences interaction term. Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 4. Treatment effect of subsidies
(Cases I, IV, V, VI).
Case I

Case IV

Case V

Case VI

Subsidies

–0.120*
(0.063)

0.130*
(0.069)

0.080
(0.060)

–0.100
(0.068)

time
(Rounds 7-21)

–0.116*
(0.059)

0.100*
(0.063)

2.10e-1
(0.058)

0.060
(0.059)

time*S

0.346***
(0.083)

–0.016
(0.083)

0.006
(0.077)

0.093
(0.085)

Constant

0.350***
(0.047)

0.530***
(0.050)

0.720***
(0.045)

0.680***
(0.046)

R-squared

0.045

0.027

0.009

0.017

n

500

Note. The dependent variable is a dummy taking the value one if subjects are willing to cooperate
in R&D. Subsidies is a dummy equal to one for the treatment groups. time is a dummy taking value
one for those rounds (7-21) in the treatment groups where 30 MUs are provided to cooperating
subjects. time*S is the differences-in-differences interaction term. Bootstrapped standard errors in
parenthesis.
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Table 5. Difference between cooperative and non-cooperative investment rates in
cases II and III.
Within Control

Within Treatment

Case II

Case III

Case II

Case III

CI

–0.048
(0.033)

–0.029
(0.046)

–0.042*
(0.024)

–0.100*
(0.051)

time
(Rounds 7-21)

0.047
(0.041)

0.052
(0.042)

–0.003
(0.022)

0.150***
(0.044)

CI *time

–0.011
(0.078)

–0.064
(0.067)

0.010
(0.032)

–0.166***
(0.063)

Constant

0.206***
(0.029)

0.576***
(0.031)

0.143***
(0.018)

0.553***
(0.032)

R-squared

0.009

0.013

0.011

0.163

n

250

Note. The dependent variable is the subjects’ rate of investment (i.e., the ratio between the per-round
individual investment level and the endowment of 200 MUs). The variable CI is a dummy equal to
one for those subjects that invest cooperatively in R&D. time is a dummy variable taking the value
one for those rounds (7-21) in the treatment groups where 30 MUs are provided to cooperating
subjects. CI*time is the differences-in-differences interaction term. Bootstrapped standard errors in
parenthesis

33
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2022

35

Submission to Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers

FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI WORKING PAPER SERIES
“NOTE DI LAVORO”
Our Working Papers are available on the Internet at the following address:
http://www.feem.it/getpage.aspx?id=73&sez=Publications&padre=20&tab=1
“NOTE DI LAVORO” PUBLISHED IN 2022

1. 2022, Daniele Crotti, Elena Maggi, Evangelia Pantelaki, Urban cycling tourism. How can bikes and
public transport ride together for sustainability?
2. 2022, Antonio Acconcia, Sergio Beraldo, Carlo Capuano, Marco Stimolo, Public subsidies and
cooperation in research and development. Evidence from the lab.

https://services.bepress.com/feem

36

Acconcia et al.: Public subsidies and cooperation in research and development

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
Corso Magenta 63, Milano – Italia
Tel. +39 02.520.36934
Fax. +39.02.520.36946
E-mail: letter@feem.it
www.feem.it

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2022

37

